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SPECIAL FEATURE 
LESSONS FROM RELOCATIONS PAST: CLIMATE 
CHANGE, TRIBES, AND THE NEED FOR PRAGMATISM 
IN COMMUNITY RELOCATION PLANNING 
Eli Keene
*
 
Introduction  
The first American communities that will be forced to adapt to the new 
era of rapid global climatic change are some of the continent’s oldest. Up 
and down the coasts of the mainland United States and Alaska, American 
Indian and Alaska Native tribes are already confronting accelerating 
erosion and increased coastal flooding. Scientists generally project that sea 
levels will rise an average of one to four feet by 2100, the upper bound of 
which would permanently inundate large swaths of U.S. coastal cities such 
as New Orleans and Miami.
1
 But for many coastal tribes, this future is 
already a reality. Faced with the possibility that their lands and homes are 
one storm away from being washed out to sea, a number of American 
Indian communities are already deciding where they will go once their land 
is no longer inhabitable. 
                                                                                                                 
 * Associate at Clifford Chance, Washington, D.C. J.D., 2017, Columbia Law School; 
B.A., 2011, Columbia College, Columbia University. This paper was based on research 
connected to the author’s work as a research associate for America's Eroding Edges, a 
National Geographic-funded project on climate change and cultural heritage in the United 
States. 
First-place winner, 2016-2017 American Indian Law Review Writing Competition. 
 1. John Walsh et al., Chapter 2: Our Changing Climate, in CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS 
IN THE UNITED STATES: THE THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 66 (Jerry M. Melillo, 
Terese (T.C.) Richmond & Gary W. Yohe eds., 2014) [hereinafter 3RD NAT’L ASSESSMENT] 
(providing a medium confidence assessment that “global sea level rise will be in the range of 
1 to 4 feet by 2100”); Sea Level Rise and Coastal Flooding Impacts, NAT'L OCEANIC & 
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://coast.noaa.gov/slr (last visited Dec. 24, 2016) (providing 
detailed maps of projected sea level rise across the United States). In early 2017, National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Association (NOAA) revised its sea level rise projections to 
reflect new models of Antarctic ice sheet collapse. The Agency’s revised “extreme” scenario 
shows global mean sea levels rising by up to 8.2 feet by 2100. See WILLIAM V. SWEET ET AL., 
NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., GLOBAL AND REGIONAL SEA LEVEL RISE 
SCENARIOS FOR THE UNITED STATES vi (2017); see also Robert M. DeConto & David Pollard, 
Contribution of Antarctica to Past and Future Sea-Level Rise, 531 NATURE 591 (2016).  
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The question of where and how to assist Indian communities when 
coastal armoring measures prove unfeasible presents a number of options. 
One such option is to do nothing, allowing communities to disperse as 
flooding and erosion threaten individual homes and communal 
infrastructure. Alternatively, a community could be “collocated,” meaning 
it would be wholesale integrated into an existing urban or suburban area. 
Finally, communities could be voluntary relocated as a whole, transplanting 
the entire population to a new site located on safer ground. 
The preferred option for many tribal communities is voluntary 
community relocation. As of 2016, at least ten Indian communities across 
the United States are seriously considering wholesale community relocation 
as a means of adaptation to climate change.
2
 Nevertheless, there are a 
number of obstacles to successfully relocating communities, not least of 
which is the prohibitive cost of doing so. As a result, state and federal 
agencies have made little progress on making community relocation a 
reality.
3
 With little movement on formulating a national framework for 
relocation of climate-displaced tribal communities, it is increasingly likely 
that these communities will face either makeshift collocation or complete 
dispersal when they are evacuated due to an extreme weather event.
4
 
                                                                                                                 
 2. These communities are: Kivalina, AK; Newtok, AK; Shaktoolik, AK; Shishmaref, 
AK; Isle de Jean Charles, LA; the Hoh Indian Reservation (WA); the village of La Push on 
the Quileute Reservation (WA); the Sauk-Suiattle Indian Reservation (WA); the village of 
Tahola on the Quinault Indian Reservation (WA); and the community of Tulalip Bay on the 
Tulalip Indian Reservation (WA). Native communities in Hawai’i and U.S. territories in the 
Pacific are also considering relocation, but fall outside the scope of this paper. See T.M. Bull 
Bennett et al., Chapter 12: Indigenous Peoples, Land and Resources, in 3RD NAT’L 
ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at 297-317; U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ALASKA 
NATIVE VILLAGES: LIMITED PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE ON RELOCATING VILLAGES 
THREATENED BY FLOODING AND EROSION, 20 (2009) [hereinafter GAO 2009]. A number of 
Native villages in Alaska are also pursuing partial relocation efforts, moving individual 
homes and communal buildings to higher ground within the existing village. There is no 
comprehensive list of communities engaged in gradual relocation, but they include the 
Alaska Native villages of Allakaket, Golovin, Hughes, Huslia, Koyukuk, Nulato, Teller, and 
Unalakleet.  
 3. GAO 2009, supra note 2; Robin Bronen, Climate-Induced Community Relocations: 
Creating an Adaptive Governance Framework Based in Human Rights Doctrine, 35 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 357 (2011). 
 4. In December 2016, reports quietly surfaced that the Obama Administration had 
convened an interagency taskforce to begin to develop such a framework. At the time of 
writing, it remains unclear whether this task force will survive the next presidential 
administration. See Christopher Flavelle, Obama’s Final Push to Adapt to Climate Change, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-12-16/obama-
s-final-push-to-adapt-to-climate-change.  
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This Article places the options for government action on climate-induced 
relocation into the context of the Indian and Alaska Native relocation 
efforts of the Termination Era of the 1950s. These relocation programs hold 
important lessons for formulating policies on relocation today. Most 
importantly, moving communities comes with high social and economic 
costs that extend beyond replacing physical infrastructure. These costs must 
be addressed not only in concluding that community relocation is the best-
case scenario for affected tribes, but also for addressing the needs of these 
communities if relocation cannot ultimately be funded.  
Part I of this Article presents three short case studies of Indian and 
Alaska Native communities that are seeking to relocate away from the 
coast. Part II introduces the advantages and disadvantages of community 
relocation and collocation, and examines the likely outcomes if no action is 
taken. Part III places the options for tribal coastal retreat in the context of 
two 1950s relocation events—the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ (BIA) urban 
relocation program and the resettlement of the Alaska Native population of 
King Island to Nome in the 1960s. Finally, Part IV argues that current 
discussions of relocating climate-threatened Indian and Alaska Native 
communities do not integrate lessons learned from past relocation efforts 
and are therefore likely to produce similarly negative results. 
I. Tribes and Coastal Retreat 
American Indian communities on the coastlines experience the effects of 
climate change in different ways. While the primary concerns are the same 
across the United States—accelerated coastal erosion and sea level rise—
the legal backgrounds from which American Indian communities approach 
these concerns vary significantly. These varying legal statuses mean that 
affected communities have used different forms of leverage with varying 
degrees of success in attempting to procure funding for relocation and 
adaptation planning. This Part provides a cross-section of these experiences 
by briefly introducing three different communities seeking to relocate away 
from the coast. These case studies introduce the common challenges faced 
by tribes seeking to relocate, including the problem of obtaining the funds 
to do so. 
A. Isle de Jean Charles, Louisiana 
Isle de Jean Charles is a narrow island approximately eighty miles 
southwest of New Orleans. It is connected to the surrounding Bayou by a 
single, narrow, un-elevated road. The island has lost about ninety-eight 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
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percent of its total landmass since 1955,
5
 a result of upriver levee 
construction, wetland degradation, and a gradual rise in sea level.
6
 Any 
notion that the remaining sliver of land could be saved was abandoned in 
2002, when the Army Corps of Engineers concluded that extending an 
ongoing levee project to protect Isle de Jean Charles was cost prohibitive.
7
 
Permanent relocation of the island’s residents was first proposed by the 
Army Corps of Engineers in its 2002 assessment of the levee project.
8
 In 
2016, the State of Louisiana received a $92.6 million resilience grant from 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), $48 million of 
which was allocated to relocate the Isle de Jean Charles community to safer 
ground.
9
  
Isle de Jean Charles is thought to have been initially settled sometime in 
the 1800s by intermarried French and American Indian families.
10
 While 
the island’s population grew, at one point, to some 300 people, the damage 
done by strong hurricanes—in particular, Hurricane Katrina, in 2005—has 
dispersed most residents and the current population has dwindled to about 
sixty.
11
 Most of the residents are members of the Biloxi-Chitimacha-
Choctaw tribe, though the United Houma Nation also claims several of the 
                                                                                                                 
 5. STATE OF LA., NATIONAL DISASTER RESILIENCE COMPETITION: PHASE II APPLICATION 
105 (2015), http://www.doa.la.gov/ocddru/ndrc/ndrc_pii_final_eximg.pdf [hereinafter NDR 
APPLICATION]. 
 6. Louisiana Coastal Wetlands: A Resource at Risk, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SERV., 
https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/la-wetlands/ (last visited Dec. 24, 2016); Ricardo A. Olea & James 
L. Coleman, Jr., A Synoptic Examination of Causes of Land Loss in Southern Louisiana as 
Related to the Exploitation of Subsurface Geologic Resources, 30 J. COASTAL RES. 1025 
(2014). 
 7. Marisa Katz, Comment, Staying Afloat: How Federal Recognition as a Native 
American Tribe Will Save the Residents of Isle De Jean Charles, Louisiana, 4 LOY. J. PUB. 
INT. L. 1 (2003). 
 8. Rick Bragg, As the Sea Swallows, the Islanders Hang On, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 
2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/30/us/as-the-sea-swallows-the-islanders-hang-
on.html. 
 9. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., HUD Award $1 Billion Through 
National Disaster Resilience Competition (Jan. 21, 2016), https://archives.hud.gov/news/ 
2016/pr16-006.cfm.  
 10. Bienvenue, Aiokpanchi, Welcome to Isle de Jean Charles, ISLE DE JEAN CHARLES, 
http://www.isledejeancharles.com/island (last visited Dec. 24, 2016). 
 11. Carolyn Van Houten, The First Official Climate Refugees in the U.S. Race Against 
Time, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (May 25, 2016), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/05/ 
160525-isle-de-jean-charles-louisiana-sinking-climate-change-refugees/. 
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island’s remaining families.12 While both of these tribes are recognized by 
the State of Louisiana, neither has ever received federal recognition.
13
 Land 
on the island has been held in fee since the State opened it for sale in 1876, 
and is not legally considered Indian Country.
14
 This means that the 
community is not eligible for special treatment afforded to federally 
recognized tribes, such as the ability to put lands into trust, the ability to 
apply to certain grants as a tribe, and the general benefit of the federal trust 
responsibility.
15
 
Members of the community have advocated for relocation both as a way 
to preserve traditional practices and bring back those that have already been 
lost. The community’s new site design, for example, includes ceremonial 
space for pow wows, which the Tribe has not held since Hurricane Katrina 
hit in 2005.
16
 The community has lost significant aspects of its traditional 
subsistence lifestyle, in part because almost all the land available for 
agriculture has been washed away.
17
 The new site plan will also include 
large swaths of agricultural land in an attempt to support the growing of 
subsistence and cash crops to offset current reliance on grocery stores.
18
 In 
this way, relocation is seen as an opportunity not only for enhancing 
community safety, but also as a way to bolster cultural cohesion and 
economic stability for the Tribe. 
Several community members are resistant to the idea of relocating, even 
as plans move forward. The first sight off Island Road, which connects Isle 
de Jean Charles to the nearby community of Pointe-aux-Chenes, is a 
handwritten sign declaring “WE ARE NEVER MOVING OFF THIS 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Jacob Batte, Tensions Arise Between Local Indian Tribes over Effort to Abandon 
Sinking Island, HOUMA TODAY (May 11, 2016), http://www.houmatoday.com/article/ 
DA/20160511/News/608085968/HC.  
 13. Katz, supra note 7. 
 14. Bienvenue, Aiokpanchi, Welcome to Isle de Jean Charles, supra note 10. 
 15. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974) (describing “federally 
recognized tribes” as a political, rather than a racial classification); Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 
U.S. 379, 380 (2009) (holding that the Secretary of the Interior is statutorily authorized to 
take lands into trust only for tribes that were federally recognized in 1934, at the time the 
Indian Reorganization Act was passed). 
 16. The Vision, ISLE DE JEAN CHARLES: RESETTLEMENT AND SURVIVAL, 
http://www.coastalresettlement.org/the-vision.html (last visited Dec. 24, 2016); Van Houten, 
supra note 11. 
 17. WORKSHOP REPORT INPUT INTO THE NAT’L CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, STORIES OF 
CHANGE: COASTAL LOUISIANA TRIBAL COMMUNITIES’ EXPERIENCES OF A TRANSFORMING 
ENVIRONMENT (2012), https://downloads.globalchange.gov/nca/technical_inputs/Coastal 
LouisianaTribalCommunities2012StoriesOfChange.pdf. 
 18. NDR APPLICATION, supra note 5, at 410; Van Houten, supra note 11.  
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ISLAND.” Nevertheless, there is recognition, even among the few 
remaining holdouts, that the island will not always remain inhabitable.
19
 
Today, Chief Albert Naquin, who has spearheaded relocation efforts for the 
community, estimates that about forty families would initially relocate to 
the new site, with more to follow as conditions on the island worsened.
20
  
B. Native Village of Shishmaref, Alaska 
Located 4000 miles northwest of Isle de Jean Charles on a barrier island 
in the Chukchi Sea, Shishmaref is one of the most populated Native villages 
in northwest Alaska and is home to some 600 people. Like many Alaska 
Native villages, the founding story of Shishmaref is not well documented. 
Inupiaq communities in northwest Alaska were traditionally semi-nomadic, 
and local knowledge suggests that Shishmaref became a permanent 
settlement due to the construction of a BIA School on the island in the 
1920s.
21
 Flooding and erosion have been a problem for decades and have 
become worse as warmer temperatures have caused shore-fast ice to freeze 
up later in the season, reducing the village’s natural barrier against storm 
surges.
22
 The island’s erosion problem has gained national recognition, 
thanks in part to several harrowing images of houses sliding into the 
Chukchi Sea in the aftermath of fall storms.
23
 
The legal status of Shishmaref is defined by the Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act of 1971 (ANCSA). The ANCSA extinguished all Native 
land claims,
24
 granting, instead, fee title in certain lands to for-profit 
                                                                                                                 
 19. See Chris LeBlanc, Love and Defiance: Few Holdouts Remain on Isle de Jean 
Charles, HOUMA TODAY (Mar. 17, 2015) http://www.houmatoday.com/news/20150307/ 
love-and-defiance-few-holdouts-remain-on-isle-de-jean-charles. 
 20. Albert Naquin, Chief of the Isle de Jean Charles Band of Biloxi-Chitimacha-
Choctaw Indians, Presentation at the CEQ Symposium on Climate Displacement, Migration, 
and Relocation (Dec. 13, 2016) (on file with author).  
 21. Interview with Percy Nayokpuk, Shishmaref resident, in Shishmaref, AK (Aug. 21, 
2016); see also ELIZABETH MARINO, FIERCE CLIMATE, SACRED GROUND: AN ETHNOGRAPHY 
OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN SHISHMAREF, ALASKA 43 (2015). 
 22. Victoria Herrmann & Eli Keene, A Continual State of Emergency: Climate Change 
and Native Lands in Northwest Alaska, ARCTIC INST. (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.the 
arcticinstitute.org/continual-state-emergency-climate-change-native-lands-northwest-alaska/.  
 23. See, e.g., Christopher Mele & Daniel Victor, Reeling from Effects of Climate 
Change, Alaskan Village Votes to Relocate, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2016), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2016/08/20/us/shishmaref-alaska-elocate-vote-climate-change.html. 
 24. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971) 
(codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629h (2012)). 
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regional and village-level Native corporations.
25
 While the ANCSA 
resolved, with some controversy, the issue of land claims in Alaska, the 
federal status of Native tribes in the state remained unclear until 1993. That 
year, the BIA, for the first time, published a comprehensive list of 226 
Alaska Native villages that, in the BIA’s opinion, constituted federally 
recognized tribes with “the same governmental status as other federally 
acknowledged Indian tribes by virtue of their status as Indian tribes with a 
government-to-government relationship with the United States.”26 
Shishmaref first voted to relocate in 2002, but the effort stalled when the 
necessary financial resources could not be obtained.
27
 Sensing a renewed 
federal commitment to help Alaska Natives following President Barack 
Obama’s visit to the state in 2015,28 the village held another vote in August 
2016, where the measure to relocate the village narrowly passed. The 
village is considering several sites for relocation across the Shishmaref 
Inlet, where many residents maintain seasonal campsites.
29
 Shishmaref is 
heavily dependent on subsistence hunting—mainly the hunting of marine 
mammals like bearded seal—and the nearby location would allow residents 
to continue subsistence activities to the extent they are not otherwise 
impeded by environmental changes.
30
 While there have been volumes of 
media reports and even government studies concerning plans for relocating 
the village, to date there has been no money allocated to begin moving the 
community to a new site. It is estimated that the cost of relocating the 
                                                                                                                 
 25. 43 U.S.C. § 1613. The settlement under the ANCSA also included provisions for 
oil, gas, and mineral revenue sharing with Alaska Native tribes. See id. § 1608. 
 26. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 58 Fed. Reg. 54364-01 (Oct. 21, 1993), 1993 WL 420646. 
 27. Merrit Kennedy, Threatened by Rising Seas, Alaska Village Decides to Relocate, 
NPR (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/08/18/490519540/ 
threatened-by-rising-seas-an-alaskan-village-decides-to-relocate. 
 28. See Press Release, White House, Remarks by the President at the GLACIER 
Conference—Anchorage, AK (Aug. 31, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-
press-office/2015/09/01/remarks-president-glacier-conference-anchorage-ak.  
 29. Lisa Demer, Shishmaref Votes to Relocate from Eroding Barrier Island to 
Mainland, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Aug. 19, 2016), https://www.adn.com/alaska-
news/2016/08/18/eroding-village-of-shishmaref-votes-in-favor-of-relocating-to-mainland-a-
key-step/. 
 30. Residents report that hunting for bearded seal has become increasingly dangerous as 
sea ice does not freeze as solid or for as long as in the past. See MARINO, supra note 21, at 
78. 
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village to one of the new sites would be around $180 million, for which 
there is not currently a designated federal funding source.
31
 
C. Village of Taholah, Quinault Indian Reservation, Washington 
The village of Taholah sits at the mouth of the Quinault river, about 100 
miles west of Seattle, on the Quinault Indian Reservation. The village has 
always been vulnerable to tsunamis, but coastal flooding, mudslides, and 
erosion have become problematic in recent years.
32
 In 2014, the sea wall 
that protects the village was breached in a storm, destroying several 
buildings and leading the tribe to "declare[] a state of emergency."
33
  
Unlike the other communities explored in this part, Taholah is located on 
reservation land. The Quinault, therefore, have access to a range of benefits 
specifically for federally recognized tribes. At the same time, they also face 
the numerous difficulties connected to the United States’ colonial history. 
The Quinault Reservation was completely allotted after the passage of the 
Dawes Act of 1887, leaving the Quinault Nation with no tribal land by 
1933.
34
 Relocation will mean acquiring allotted land and requesting that the 
Department of the Interior place that land into trust. In order to do this, the 
tribe plans to use resources from the $1.9 billion Trust Land Consolidation 
Fund created by the 2010 settlement of the Cobell class action lawsuit 
concerning incorrect accounting of Indian trust assets by the U.S. 
government.
35
 There is little question that the U.S. government has treaty 
obligations to the tribe under the Quinault River Treaty of 1855, as well as 
the general Indian trust responsibility owed to federally recognized tribes. 
In 2015, Fawn Sharp, President of the Quinault Nation, pressed both of 
these duties, testifying before Congress that the federal government had 
                                                                                                                 
 31. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, SHISHMAREF PARTNERSHIP: SHISHMAREF RELOCATION 
AND COLLOCATION STUDY app. 1, at 7 (2004), https://www.commerce.alaska.gov/web/Por 
tals/4/pub/USACE_relocation%20plan_shishmaref.pdf [hereinafter SHISHMAREF RELOCATION 
AND COLLOCATION STUDY].  
 32. Eliza Hotchkiss, DOE Assists Quinault Indian Nation with Plans for a Climate-
Resilient Community, U.S. DEP’T. ENERGY (June 15, 2016), http://energy.gov/indianenergy/ 
articles/doe-assists-quinault-indian-nation-plans-climate-resilient-community. 
 33. Quinault Nation Declares State of Emergency After Taholah Seawall Breach, 
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Mar. 26, 2014), https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/ 
environment/quinault-nation-declares-state-of-emergency-after-taholah-seawall-breach/. 
 34. Justine E. James, Jr. with Leilani A. Chubby, Quinault, in OLYMPIC PENINSULA 
INTERTRIBAL CULTURAL ADVISORY COMM., NATIVE PEOPLES OF THE OLYMPIC PENINSULA 99, 
109 (Jacilee Wray ed., 2002). 
 35. See Claims Resolution Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-291, 124 Stat 3064. 
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“failed to meet its solemn obligations,” and lobbied for several million 
dollars in relocation support.
36
 
The tribe estimates that relocating the 700-person village of Taholah will 
cost about $60 million, or $85,000 per resident.
37
 The relatively low cost 
per person is, in part, explained by the availability of immediately adjacent 
land—what is currently known as Upper Village—situated at 120 feet 
above sea level.
38
 The nearby site also provides continuity for commercial, 
subsistence, and ceremonial salmon fishing and seafood harvesting 
practices that are central to the tribe’s culture and economy.39 While no 
federal funds have yet been appropriated for the relocation, the tribe 
completed a master plan in 2016 with the aid of a “$700,000 grant from the 
Administration for Native Americans.”40 
II. Options for Assisting Coastal Retreat 
Academics and policymakers working on issues of community 
adaptation to climate change have settled around three general alternatives 
for coastal retreat planning for imminently threatened communities. When 
it comes to Indian and Alaska Native communities, by far the most 
attention has been given to the process of community relocation—moving 
an entire community to safer ground. Community relocation has often been 
presented in contrast to “collocation,” wherein an entire community is 
moved together into another existing community.
41
 The question of what 
                                                                                                                 
 36. Fawn Sharp, President of Quinault Indian Nation, Quinault Indian Nation 
Appropriations Testimony: House Interior Appropriations Subcommittee (Mar. 24, 2015), 
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AP/AP06/20150324/102898/HHRG-114-AP06-Wstate-
SharpF-20150324.pdf [hereinafter Fawn Sharp Testimony].  
 37. Ashley Ahearn, Facing Rising Waters, a Native Tribe Takes Its Plea to Paris 
Climate Talks, NPR (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/12/01/455745765/facing-
rising-waters-a-native-tribe-takes-its-plea-to-paris-climate-talks.  
 38. Taholah Village Relocation Master Plan, QUINAULT INDIAN NATION, 
http://www.quinaultindiannation.com/planning/projectinfo.html (last modified May 16, 
2017). 
 39. See Meet Native America: Fawn Sharp, President of the Quinault Indian Nation, 
President of the Affiliated Tribes of Northwest Indians and Area Vice President of the National 
Congress of American Indians, NAT’L MUSEUM OF AM. INDIAN (Feb. 22, 2016) 
http://blog.nmai.si.edu/main/2016/02/meet-native-america-fawn-sharp.html; James & Chubby, 
supra note 34, at 105. 
 40. Fawn Sharp Testimony, supra note 36. 
 41. The term “collocation” appears to have arisen specifically with reference to Alaska 
Native communities threatened by climate change. The term is used in order to distinguish 
relocation—i.e., the moving of a community to a previously unsettled site—from the act of 
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happens should neither of these responses materialize has received less 
attention in the context of Indian communities. This “do nothing” option 
places the question of coastal retreat into the hands of individual 
community members and disaster response protocols, both of which are 
likely to result in the dispersal of the community. 
A. Community Relocation 
What are the benefits of moving a community together to a new, 
previously unoccupied space? These benefits are not easily quantifiable into 
academic research. Nevertheless, hints may be drawn from two sources: 
statements from members of affected communities and the robust available 
literature on development-induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR), 
which examines outcomes in communities displaced by large infrastructure 
projects. The latter of these sources has identified a set of eight risks
42
 faced 
by displaced communities: landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, 
decreased access to common resources, marginalization, increased 
morbidity, food insecurity, and negative social and cultural impacts. Some 
of these risks directly reflect problems posed by collocation or community 
dispersion. Resettlement in any form has been suggested to have physical, 
economic, psychological, legal, cultural, environmental, and other effects, 
and the factors discussed below are by no means an exhaustive list of the 
risks populations face in relocating.
43
 
The negative cultural impacts identified in DIDR literature have been 
summarized as taking the form of “social disarticulation.”44 Social 
disarticulation refers to the breakdown of formal and informal support 
networks in a community, which can have lasting negative impacts on 
economic status and general well-being.
45
 The concern about the loss of 
these social ties is reflected in a number of forms within climate-threatened 
communities. In Shishmaref, for example, residents have expressed concern 
that collocating to Nome would cause the “village family” to collapse into 
nuclear families. This would mean concerns like childcare and care for the 
                                                                                                                 
expanding an existing community to accommodate those displaced from another location. 
See, e.g., SHISHMAREF RELOCATION AND COLLOCATION STUDY, supra note 31. 
 42. See, e.g., A. de Sherbinin et al., Preparing for Resettlement Associated with Climate 
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elderly would cease to be a village concern and fall on individual parents or 
state facilities.
46
 The maintenance of social bonds was also cited by the Isle 
de Jean Charles community as a primary reason that relocation should be 
tackled on the community level, as opposed to at the level of individual 
residents.
47
 
Similarly, community relocation may help address the risks of loss of 
common resources and food insecurity in certain communities. The most 
obvious factor in mitigating this risk is that communities can be relocated to 
an area that is near traditional lands—including hunting and fishing 
grounds—but out of the hazard zone. Indeed, communities like 
Shishmaref,
48
 Taholah,
49
 and Isle de Jean Charles
50
 have all sought to 
resettle on land that was either contiguous or otherwise easily accessible to 
the original settlement, seeking to preserve access to traditional livelihoods 
and cultural heritage. 
These risks may be further allayed by community relocation in 
communities that maintain traditions of food sharing and group hunting. It 
is common practice in Inupiaq communities, for example, to share 
subsistence foods throughout the community, particularly with elders.
51
 
Food security may therefore be threatened not only by the difficulty of 
continuing subsistence hunting in the new location, but by the breakdown in 
food sharing traditions as well.  
But while there are definite benefits to community relocation over the 
collocation and do-nothing variants, there are also major obstacles to 
successfully relocating a community. The first, and most serious, of these 
obstacles is that community relocation is expensive. The cost problem is 
particularly acute in Alaska, where isolation and a short building season 
drive up the cost of construction. Relocation costs for the Native village of 
Kivalina, with a population of under 400, are projected to go as high as 
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$400 million. While the costs are not quite as high in the Lower 48, the 
process of conducting site studies, acquiring land, building up infrastructure 
from scratch, moving populations, and tearing down the old site is not 
cheap. The Isle de Jean Charles resettlement has been allocated $48 million 
to accommodate an initial population of around sixty people—about 
$800,000 per resident.
52
 At this point in time, the State of Louisiana is 
uncertain that the $48 million will be sufficient to cover all costs.
53
 
Relocation is further complicated by the fact that no single federal or 
state agency has authority to coordinate and implement the relocation of 
communities.
54
 This lack of authority has been thoroughly explored by Dr. 
Robin Bronen in the context of Alaska. Bronen has identified several 
impacts of this lack of authority, including the lack of any guiding 
principles on assisting communities in the relocation process.
55
 Planning 
and guidelines are important because a badly managed relocation may raise 
the likelihood that community members will not stay at the new site or that 
the community may experience cultural or economic loss that the relocation 
was meant to avoid.
56
 
This problem further complicates funding. Today, communities must 
either seek non-relocation-specific block grants (as in the case of Isle de 
Jean Charles) or piece together multiple grants from a variety of agencies 
(as in the case of the Native village of Newtok in Alaska). The latter option 
raises additional problems in that, under the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA), any proposal for a major federal action “significantly 
affecting the quality of the human environment” requires that agency 
prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) or a less-intensive 
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Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA).
57
 With no lead agency in charge 
of a single, unified relocation project, piecing together relocation grant 
funding from multiple agencies would require producing an individual EIS 
or EIA for each agency involved. Given that a typical EIS ranges in cost 
from $250,000 to $2 million, this approach ultimately raises the cost of 
relocation efforts even further.
58
  
B. Collocation 
The option of collocating displaced communities into nearby existing 
communities has largely been discussed in Alaska. The major advantage of 
collocation over community relocation is cost. Whereas relocation requires 
the acquisition of land, the building of access roads for construction, and 
the building up of infrastructure from nothing, collocation is, on its face, 
merely a matter of expanding existing housing stock and support 
infrastructure. Thus, a 2004 Army Corps of Engineers study projected that 
relocating Shishmaref to the mainland would cost approximately $179 
million, whereas collocating the community with Nome or Kotzebue would 
cost $93 million or $140 million, respectively.
59
 
Collocation has a number of anticipated downsides and has thus been 
squarely rejected as a viable alternative both by communities considering 
it
60
 and by the Army Corps of Engineers.
61
 In considering options for 
saving the Native village of Newtok, the Army Corps of Engineers 
concluded, “Collocation would destroy the Newtok community identity,” 
and noted that the lack of support for collocation would lead many in the 
community to consider it “forced.”62 This conclusion is largely based on 
past experience. The recent history of resettling Indians and Alaska Natives, 
as detailed in Part III, exhibited disastrous social and economic effects on 
collocated communities. 
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C. Do-Nothing Approach  
The final approach is for the federal and state governments to do nothing 
to preserve tribal community in managing coastal retreat. As presented 
here, the “do nothing” approach does not necessarily mean a complete lack 
of federal action. Instead there are two basic approaches, both of which will 
lead to community dispersal. First, the federal government (for tribal lands) 
or state governments (for land not subject to federal tribal land restrictions) 
could orchestrate a buyout of vulnerable properties. The approach of paying 
pre-disaster fair market value for property has been used by states to 
disperse non-Indian communities living in environmental hazard zones.
63
 It 
should be noted, however, that land value in climate-threatened Indian and 
Alaska Native communities is often quite low, and a buyout program is 
unlikely to provide the assistance needed to relocate elsewhere. 
The second approach is to do nothing until a natural disaster occurs. In 
this case, a set of state and federal disaster relief laws and protocols will be 
used to evacuate the affected community. The role of disaster law in 
climate change adaptation has already garnered some attention from 
scholars and policymakers.
64
 However, the punting of climate-induced 
relocation to disaster management protocols does not necessarily have to be 
an affirmative choice made by policymakers. While climate change itself 
has been described as a “slow-moving disaster,” its individual effects, such 
as major flooding and erosion events, are fast-onset.
65
 Unless a community 
is able to design, fund, and implement a relocation plan before a sufficiently 
serious flooding or erosion event occurs, disaster response is the default 
solution. 
There is no coherent body of “disaster law” in the United States. As a 
matter of federalism, emergency response to national disasters is left to 
state, local, and tribal governments. As a practical matter, however, the 
federal government has come to play the dominant role in funding and 
implementing disaster response.
66
 Federal assistance to state, local, and 
tribal governments is governed by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief 
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and Emergency Response Act of 1988.
67
 Disaster management is 
coordinated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 
which since 2003 has been a part of the Department of Homeland 
Security.
68
 
For purposes of this discussion, the first action likely to be undertaken 
during a severe flooding event is an emergency evacuation. The decision to 
declare an evacuation in the case of emergency rests with state, tribal, and 
local governments. FEMA provides federal support in evacuating residents 
to the extent that state or tribal resources are overwhelmed.
69
 Many of these 
communities have already experienced temporary evacuations. In 2007, 
residents of Kivalina were forced to escape fall storms by bush planes, all-
terrain vehicles and boats. In Louisiana, many coastal communities, have 
been subject to repeated evacuation orders by parish governments in the 
face of severe storms and associated flooding.
70
  
Evacuations are, in theory, temporary—but what happens after an 
evacuation is relevant to the community relocation, particularly where 
uncertainty exists as to the inhabitability of the evacuated community. For 
disasters that rise to the level of requiring federal assistance, the Stafford 
Act provides for both immediate life-saving measures and shelter assistance 
as well as temporary federal housing assistance.
71
 This assistance, in the 
form of rent or hotel cost aid or direct assistance (temporary housing 
trailers), can be provided for up to eighteen months, or longer if extended 
by the president.
72
  
In practice, disasters tend to drive people into external support networks, 
such as family members, before federal housing support is mobilized.
73
 In 
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the month after Hurricane Katrina, for example, requests for Stafford Act 
assistance came from all fifty states.
74
 After a year, just over fifty percent of 
the population of New Orleans had returned to the city.
75
 Perhaps more 
importantly for this discussion, studies demonstrated a significant amount 
of intra-parish displacement, suggesting that communities were likely being 
fragmented, even where net population figures at the parish level did not 
reflect significant changes.
76
 Thus, disaster-induced evacuations have the 
capacity to induce long-term fracturing of communities. 
When a disaster leaves no community to return to, it is unlikely that 
communities would find themselves long-term relocated together. Climate-
threatened Indian communities, therefore, have a marked interest in 
avoiding a disaster management approach to managing climate threats. 
Disaster management response protocols are poorly equipped to handle the 
concerns of a community as a group. 
III. A Modern History of Indian Relocation 
As discussed above, there are several clear advantages to community 
relocation over other approaches to coastal retreat. But, as also 
demonstrated, the obstacles of obtaining funding and support for relocation 
are large. It is important to recognize that merely concluding that 
community relocation is the best response for Indian communities does not 
resolve the problem. A community that faces catastrophic disaster before it 
is able to plan, fund, and implement a relocation will find itself managed by 
disaster protocols. In cases where collocation is significantly cheaper, 
communities may find themselves only able to obtain resources to integrate 
into existing communities. 
It is therefore essential to look more closely at the consequences of 
dispersing communities into cities or other small settlements. This may 
prove easier in the case of American Indian communities than for any 
others. The history of American Indians is, in many senses a history of 
relocation. Beginning with the Indian Removal Acts of the 1800s, the 
United States has had a long and unenviable record of moving or providing 
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for the movement of Indian populations. Each of these relocation policies 
comes with its own lessons. 
This part contextualizes the options for coastal retreat planning by 
looking back to this history of relocation. In the interest of drawing upon 
relatively reliable data and equivalent circumstances, it draws upon two 
twentieth century case studies from the Termination Era. This Part begins 
by examining the historical significance of Termination as a federal Indian 
policy. Next, it explores two examples of Indian policy during the era: the 
BIA Urban Indian Relocation Program of the 1950s and the relocation of 
the Alaska Native population of King Island to Nome in the 1960s. Finally, 
this part presents several qualifications to these case studies and draws 
lessons for future coastal retreat planning. 
A. The Termination Era 
In 1953, the U.S. House of Representatives adopted Concurrent 
Resolution 108, which declared that it was “the policy of Congress, as 
rapidly as possible, to make the Indians within the territorial limits of the 
United States subject to the same laws . . . as are applicable to other citizens 
of the United States, [and] to end their status as wards of the United 
States.”77 The House Resolution marked a transition in federal policy—
from the previous approach of a proactive BIA to a policy of removing any 
special treatment or disability for Indian tribes. While the Resolution is 
synonymous today with the Termination Era, the roots of this shift in 
federal policy date back to the mid-1940s.
78
 
In 1928, the U.S. Senate commissioned a fifteen-year, forty-one-part 
survey on the living conditions of American Indians. At the survey’s 
conclusion in 1943, Congress accused the BIA of straying from the its 
original purpose, noting, “While the original aim [of the Bureau] was to 
make the Indian a citizen, the present aim appears to be to keep the Indian 
an Indian and to make him satisfied with all the limitations of a primitive 
life.”79 Therein lay the foundation for the termination policy. Over the next 
two decades, the federal government would terminate 109 tribes, remove 
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2.5 million acres of Indian land from trust, and repeatedly enhance state 
jurisdiction over tribes.
80
 
While debates have raged surrounding the intent of the termination 
policy, which was denounced by President Richard Nixon in 1970, the 
conditions on Indian reservations in the mid-1940s were undeniably bleak. 
In 1948 and 1949, Indians in Navajo country were brought to the brink of 
starvation by a series of blizzards that exacerbated conditions of poverty.
81
 
The poverty of the Navajo and Hopi was severe enough to garner national 
media attention.
82
 In response, Congress passed the Navajo-Hopi Long 
Range Rehabilitation Act of 1950, designating over $88 million for career 
training, social services, and the economic development of the 
reservations.
83
 The Rehabilitation Act’s emphasis on job placement and 
creation of a Navajo off-reservation employment service would lay the 
baseline for a broader Indian relocation policy to come. 
B. The Urban Indian Relocation Program 
The policy that has come to be known as the Urban Indian Relocation 
Program was never really a coherent program unto itself. Instead, it 
developed gradually throughout the 1950s, growing out of the 
government’s experience with the Navajo and Hopi. By the middle of 1951, 
the BIA had used its experience in Navajo country to expand relocation 
services to new states like California, Colorado, and Oklahoma.
84
 The 
Bureau opened up field offices across the country to help place Indians into 
employment opportunities in major urban centers, beginning with 
Chicago.
85
 In 1952, the BIA began to provide meager financial assistance to 
some relocatees, covering one-way transportation to their urban destination 
and a few weeks of transition assistance.
86
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The program grew slowly at first. By July 1956, the BIA had relocated 
12,625 Indians from reservations to cities.
87
 But in 1956, Congress provided 
for a massive shift in relocation efforts by passing Public Law 959, the 
Indian Vocational Training Act, which injected $3.5 million a year into 
relocation efforts.
88
 As the Act’s name might suggest, the Bureau would 
place renewed focus on job training, and was authorized to provide up to 
two years of free vocational training to reservation Indians.
89
 As the 
emphasis on job skills development became integrated into broader 
relocation efforts, BIA officials negotiated directly with urban employers to 
hire Indian workers.
90
 By some counts, these efforts aided some 160,000 
rural Indians in relocating to urban areas between 1952 and 1967.
91
 
The focus of the relocation program was on providing a basic level of 
transition assistance. BIA employees in Indian Country coordinated with 
urban field offices to place applicants into fitting employment in the city of 
their choosing.
92
 The financial assistance provided to a relocatee was 
generally minimal, consisting of a bus ticket, first month’s rent, clothing, 
and one month of groceries and other essentials.
93
 Relocatees had ongoing 
access to job counseling.
94
 The relocation program was heavily marketed on 
reservations, with one BIA brochure, in seeming homage to socialist 
realism, picturing smiling Indians operating heavy machinery and studying 
at a school desk with the promise of “good jobs” and “happy homes.”95 
Little consensus has emerged on the outcomes of the BIA’s urban 
relocation efforts, a fact due in part to the BIA’s shoddy record keeping on 
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relocatees.
96
 A wave of recent scholarship has underlined the importance of 
these policies in shaping modern Indian demographics, as over two-thirds 
of the country’s total Indian population now lives in urban areas.97 These 
scholars have viewed the voluntary urbanization process as an important 
first step in escaping the crushing poverty of many reservations and the 
overbearing paternalism of the BIA.
98
 The BIA itself declared the program 
a success, asserting (rather dubiously) that only thirty percent of relocatees 
returned home within a year of relocation.
99
 
But most evaluations of the BIA’s urban relocation policy were not so 
forgiving. In early 1975, Congress passed a joint resolution establishing the 
American Indian Policy Review Commission, consisting of nine task forces 
established to review specific areas of federal Indian policy.
100
 The next 
year, the Commission’s Task Force Eight delivered its Report on Urban 
and Rural Non-Reservation Indians.
101
 The Report gave a damning account 
of the struggles of relocatees in adapting to their new urban environments. 
In sum, Task Force Eight found that: 
Indian people in substantial numbers came to urban areas 
because of a lack of employment . . . but have failed to make a 
desirable transition because of a lack of necessary and sufficient, 
continued support from the Federal Government, coupled with 
the indifference and misunderstandings, by and large, existing in 
the communities in which they have chosen to live.
102
 
In particular, the comprehensive review of the Urban Indian Relocation 
Program presented by Task Force Eight repeatedly identified three 
problems newcomers encountered in cities: substandard living conditions, 
unstable employment, and cultural isolation. The confluence of 
underfunded accommodations and rampant housing discrimination quickly 
led to the creation of “Indian ghettoes.”103 The report noted that relocatees 
were often placed into squalid conditions, sometimes with an entire family 
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occupying a one-room apartment.
104
 The shortage of adequate, affordable 
housing was compounded by the fact that most Indians did not qualify for 
public housing assistance in their new cities.
105
 In Denver, for example, the 
municipal housing authority placed a six-month residency requirement on 
applicants for public housing, leaving new arrivals with few places to turn 
other than slums.
106
 
The employment arranged for the relocatees did little to alleviate these 
conditions. The vocational training arranged by the BIA failed to open up 
opportunities for advancement—with reported hourly wages for training 
participants hovering at $2.40 an hour, even lower than the $2.59 an hour 
received by Indians who were placed directly into jobs without training.
107
 
Low on the employment ladder, Indians would often be let go during 
financial downturns, and the BIA did not have adequate funding to support 
laid off workers in these circumstances.
108
 Furthermore, many relocatees 
lost any opportunity they may have had to pursue higher education. College 
education was not built into the relocation program and the scholarships 
that were generally available to Indians were not made available to those 
living off-reservation.
109
 
The conditions of the urban relocatees produced widespread feelings of 
social and cultural isolation. It is difficult to pin down a specific cause of 
this isolation, though scholars and policy reports have identified slum-like 
living conditions,
110
 culture shock,
111
 racial segregation,
112
 and lack of 
community space to hold cultural activities
113
 as contributing factors. 
Isolation was seen as a major contributing cause of alcoholism among 
urban Indians.
114
 Problems with alcohol, and resultant problems with the 
law, often caused relocatees and their families to return home.
115
  
While the Urban Indian Relocation Program did create some long-term 
positive effects, including aiding the growth of stable urban Indian 
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populations, when viewed in the context of its aims, the program was a 
failure. The program did not result in the rapid assimilation of Indians into 
the general population of U.S. cities. Nor did it raise the general standard of 
living for Indians, who largely failed to find the comfortable middle class 
lifestyle that had been marketed to them. Relocatees instead often found 
themselves in unfamiliar cities, thousands of miles from home with 
insecure jobs and no emergency government assistance available.
116
 Critics 
of the program (who were themselves accused of manipulating statistics) 
claimed that as many as seventy-five percent of relocatees returned home 
within the first year.
117
 
C. The Resettlement of King Island 
In 1930, the BIA completed construction of the first ever day school on 
King Island.
118
 The island—a mile-wide dot of steep rock cliffs in the 
Bering Sea, thirty miles off the coast of mainland Alaska—was at one point 
home to some 200 residents. The King Islanders were Inupiat subsistence 
hunters: harvesting walruses, seals, and polar bears as ice conditions 
permitted. Residents called the tiny rock island home for most of the year, 
traveling to a makeshift village outside of Nome only in the summers in 
order to sell ivory carvings, buy goods, and see friends and relatives living 
on the mainland.
119
 
In 1959, this semi-nomadic existence came to an abrupt end when the 
BIA announced the closure of the King Island school. The result was, 
effectively, the closure of King Island. That year only sixty-four residents 
returned to the island after summer’s end, and by 1966 the island had been 
abandoned.
120
 
The experience of King Island is perhaps the best example in recent U.S. 
history of collocation. But tragically little has been written about it. Indeed, 
there is only one complete account of the history of the King Islanders’ 
move to Nome—a 2004 master’s thesis by Nicole Braem, then a student at 
the University of Alaska Fairbanks.
121
 Despite the limited scholarly study, 
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the experience of King Islanders served as the baseline for both government 
agencies and affected Alaska Native communities in rejecting the 
collocation alternative. 
While analyzing the impact of the King Islanders’ collocation to Nome is 
made difficult by the lack of data and contemporary reporting, existing 
sources help highlight two conclusions. First, the King Islanders faced 
many of the same issues as urban Indian relocatees, largely brought about 
by lack of resources to aid the transition. And second—a unique lesson 
from the King Island case—is that once a community has collocated it can 
be extremely difficult to build up the political will to move that community 
to a new site. 
Following the BIA school closing, the King Islanders faced a severe 
housing crisis in Nome. The small village that had been built for Nome’s 
short summers was ill equipped to handle the harsh Alaskan winters, and 
houses were unequipped with electricity or running water.
122
 Discrimination 
blossomed as a result of this collocation. King Island children were 
harassed in schools and the slur “K.I.” came into use as a derogatory term 
referring to the newcomers.
123
 Alcohol never made inroads onto King 
Island, where strong social mores and tough environmental conditions left 
little room for drinking.
124
 These barriers broke down in Nome. Poverty, 
discrimination, and a plethora of bars allowed alcoholism to grab hold of 
many in the community.
125
  
Perhaps the most dramatic aspect, however, was the economy. Most 
available jobs in Nome at the time were seasonal—in mining or 
construction—and even those sectors were struggling.126 But while low-
paying jobs had been a problem for the urban Indians in the Lower 48, in 
Nome the issue was compounded by the loss of subsistence. In the past, 
King Islanders would earn enough money selling ivory carvings in Nome 
over the summer to buy basic provisions, obtaining the rest of their diet 
through the subsistence hunting of seals, polar bears, and walrus.
127
 But the 
sea mammal yield from Nome was minimal, and different sea ice patterns 
in Nome meant that hunters would have to travel great distances in harsh 
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conditions to harvest these animals.
128
 The loss was both economic and 
cultural. Not only was the community forced to resort to expensive store-
bought food for sustenance, the community also lost much of its traditional 
hunting knowledge in the process.
129
 
Braem’s study of the King Island move underlines a secondary 
conclusion—that once the community had established itself in Nome, it was 
unlikely to receive assistance in moving elsewhere. Already in 1959, the 
King Islanders had begun to lobby for the establishment of a new village 
for them at Cape Woolley, a small campsite due east from the Island and 
with limited road access to Nome.
130
 The idea received substantial support 
from both the Alaska offices of the BIA and the Alaska state legislature, 
which passed a resolution calling on the Secretary of the Interior to assist 
with the relocation project.
131
 Braem’s review of correspondence reflects a 
belief among the King Islanders and the Association on American Indian 
Affairs that, at least in 1961, the Cape Woolley relocation was a sure 
thing.
132
  
But the Cape Woolley plan quickly stagnated. Looming over the project 
was the cost to resettle the 150 King Islanders in Nome at the time, 
estimated at $750,000.
133
 By 1962, a variety of forces were already 
undermining the move away from Nome. That year the BIA began to raise 
questions about whether the community as a whole really desired the 
relocation or whether the campaign was the work of individual activists.
134
 
But even after the commissioning of a survey in 1963 demonstrating 
overwhelming desire to relocate to Cape Woolley, bureaucratic foot-
dragging between Washington and Alaska meant no progress was made on 
resolving questions of obtaining money, building materials and land.
135
 The 
BIA offices in Alaska, meanwhile, had decided that despite the results of 
the survey, the King Islanders had decided to delay relocation due to the 
potential establishment of an ivory carving workshop in Nome.
136
 By 1964, 
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the BIA turned its attention to the possibility of resettling King Island by 
opening an air strip on the island itself, something it ultimately concluded 
was cost-prohibitive.
137
 
In the final death knell of the Cape Woolley project, the BIA contracted 
with Frances Ross, an academic who had previously lived on King Island, 
to produce a study on what would be best for the community.
138
 By the time 
the Ross study was commissioned, six years had passed since the Cape 
Woolley relocation was first proposed, and reports from Nome suggested 
that the unanimity of the King Islanders’ desire to relocate had frayed.139 
The BIA awaited Ross’s report, which never came. By 1967, the Bureau 
had still not received a draft and, indeed, never succeeded in locating Ms. 
Ross again.
140
 
D. Qualifications and Lessons 
In seeking to draw lessons from the cases of the Urban Indian Relocation 
Program and the King Island resettlement, it is important to start with the 
question of what these case studies are not. Most importantly, they are not 
direct analogues to the socio-economic condition of Indians and Alaska 
Natives today. First, economic conditions among Indians have improved 
somewhat. While twenty-seven percent of Indians still live below the 
poverty line,
141
 Indian income per person has grown rapidly since the 
1990s, in part due to the advent of gaming in the Lower 48.
142
 
But the change of conditions is not just a matter of income. As recent 
scholars of the Urban Indian Relocation Program have noted, more than 
two-thirds of American Indians now live in urban areas.
143
 This stands in 
stark contrast to the BIA’s urban relocatees, many of whom had never 
before left the reservation.
144
  
The final word of caution in analyzing these case studies is that 
background federal Indian policy matters. Both the urban relocation 
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program and the King Island relocation played out against a background of 
Termination, where the fundamental drive of federal policy was to 
assimilate Indians into white American society. The inherently harmful 
effects of Termination have led some commentators to suggest that the 
urban relocation program was not in and of itself bad for Indians, but that 
its execution against a backdrop of cost cutting and cultural destruction 
intensified negative outcomes.
145
 Federal Indian policy today is 
dramatically different than it was in the 1950s and 60s. While it remains 
possible that this policy might change dramatically following the results of 
the 2016 presidential election, at the time of this writing in late 2016, the 
federal government has embraced an Indian policy that emphasizes an 
increased voice for tribes and respect for tribal sovereignty.
146
 
With these qualifications in mind, there are still several important 
lessons to be gleaned from these two mid-century relocations. The most 
obvious of these is that moving populations into existing communities can 
be extremely problematic for the newcomers. However, many of the 
problems that displaced communities do face are discrete issues rooted 
primarily in underinvestment in the relocation process.  
Investment in the case of collocation or dispersal is needed both to 
compensate for existing states of poverty in relocating populations and to 
help recipient communities absorb relocatees successfully. In both cases 
examined here, relocatees faced dire conditions that reflected 
underinvestment in their success in their new community. Slums 
proliferated quickly in all recipient communities, a direct result of the 
nearly complete lack of housing assistance offered to relocatees by federal, 
state, and municipal governments. Low quality housing had cascading 
effects on the lives of relocatees, and was repeatedly cited as contributing to 
alcoholism and depression. 
Similarly, relocating people from economically depressed communities 
requires major investment in job training and job creation. The case of King 
Island demonstrates the severe poverty that can result when a recipient 
community is unable to absorb newcomers into an already stagnant job 
market. Even where jobs exist, the urban Indian program demonstrates that 
problems might persist for relocatees. Racial discrimination and lack of 
adequate job training or education kept urban Indians in the 1950s in low-
paying, insecure jobs. Without investment in vocational training, higher 
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education, job placement and social services counseling, this is likely to 
continue to be a problem for relocatees today. The cost of coastal retreat, 
should therefore account for more than just physical infrastructure; it also 
must account for the various programs needed to assist relocatees transition. 
A second takeaway from these case studies is that relocatees consistently 
cited a sense of cultural loss or isolation after moving. Preserving culture in 
relocation is, perhaps, a more difficult problem than boosting living 
conditions, because it cannot be fully resolved through financial support. 
For example, little could have been done to preserve traditional subsistence 
hunting practices for King Islanders in Nome, given the geographic 
distance they had moved. Recognizing that some relocation efforts will 
produce irreparable cultural loss is, in itself, an important consideration 
when addressing relocation planning.  
Nevertheless, even in the 1950s, individual efforts sprung up in urban 
centers to provide cultural support to relocatees. During the urban 
relocation program, private donors and volunteers helped establish “Indian 
centers” in major relocation destinations.147 These centers served not only 
as a place to provide economic, social, and legal assistance to urban 
Indians, but also as a place for cultural programming and recreation aimed 
at reducing the feeling of isolation.
148
 Such cultural centers can continue to 
play a role in protecting against cultural degradation today. Indeed, one 
King Island elder in an interview in 2016 cited the lack of adequate space 
for cultural programming as contributing to the loss of traditional 
knowledge among the King Island population still living in Nome.
149
 
Finally, the King Island example, in particular, demonstrates the 
inadequacy of stop-gap fixes. Once the King Islanders were in Nome, a 
range of forces conspired to keep them there, and the perception of the 
Cape Woolley project turned from a solution, to a problem, to an additional 
problem unto itself. The King Island case demonstrates that money is not 
likely to become available to people whose immediate needs are perceived 
as being met. Further, community consensus regarding relocation may 
erode as time drags on, particularly if additional stop-gap measures (like the 
ivory workshop in Nome) are floated. Communities that aim for a specific 
relocation outcome, therefore, would do well to exercise caution when 
accepting any ‘temporary’ fix. 
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IV. Learning Lessons from the Past 
This article is primarily an appeal to pragmatism. As the above case 
studies show, community relocation can address a number of the harmful 
effects that accompany the displacement of climate-threatened 
communities. But community relocation is also expensive, and obtaining 
funds to relocate has proven exceedingly difficult. If sufficient funding 
cannot be obtained, a variety of factors are likely to push community 
members to disperse into existing cities or settlements. Whether the 
displaced community moves into existing settlements as a group or as 
individuals, the Termination Era case studies underline that displaced 
individuals will likely face a number of social and economic problems in 
their new homes. In planning for coastal retreat, Indian communities set on 
relocation must therefore plan for and pressure federal and state 
governments to prepare for what will happen if the community ends up 
displaced or dispersed. This will mean seeking support for addressing the 
anticipated problems of collocation and dispersal even while continuing to 
advocate for wholesale community relocation. 
The most obvious of these issues, and the most frequently identified 
issue by federal agencies working with climate threatened communities, is 
physical infrastructure. In both the case studies discussed in the previous 
part, relocatees were confined to substandard housing due, in part, to 
underinvestment in expanding adequate housing stock in the recipient 
community. In considering alternatives for Shishmaref, the Army Corps of 
Engineers factored in the cost of moving houses from Shishmaref to Nome 
and constructing new modular homes for residents, as well as building the 
support infrastructure to tie these homes to utilities.
150
 The Army Corps of 
Engineers also attempted to identify potential funding for the construction 
of these homes, noting that HUD would be a likely vehicle for funding, and 
in particular noting that the Native American Housing and Self 
Determination Act of 1996 (NAHASDA) allows Alaska Native villages to 
determine how HUD grants will be applied in their communities.
151
  
But the Army Corps of Engineers, in considering the cost of physical 
infrastructure, also arrives at misleading conclusions as to the cost of 
relocation. The report estimates that collocating Shishmaref with Nome 
would come to a total cost of about $93 million, representing a savings of 
$86 million over relocating the community to a new site across the 
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Shishmaref lagoon.
152
 But these savings are inflated, because they do not 
account for non-infrastructure investment in the collocated community.  
This oversight ignores the lessons of the Termination Era programs. 
Participants in the Urban Indian Relocation Program, for example, found 
themselves stuck on the bottom rung of the ladder in a competitive job 
market for which they were poorly trained. Job training at the time was not 
adequate and job counseling even less so. Thus, analyses of costs 
surrounding displacing community members to a site, other than a new 
village site, should account for the costs of training them to function in the 
economy of their destination.  
Similarly, there has been little effort to address cultural loss for 
potentially displaced Indian communities. Relocation has been repeatedly 
touted as the only means of preserving community identity among climate-
displaced tribes,
153
 with one prominent scholar branding it “the only 
immediate and permanent solution to protect people facing climate-induced 
ecological change.”154 Thus, the natural conclusion is that the choice for 
communities is to either relocate as a community or assimilate. 
But the experiences of Indian and Alaska Native communities in the 
mid-twentieth century suggest that this conclusion does not tell the whole 
story. Indeed, while some aspects of culture were and remain 
irreplaceable—such as the traditional subsistence practices of the King 
Islanders—other relocatees faced cultural losses that could have been 
ameliorated by additional investment. The upcropping of Indian Centers in 
American cities and their use to support cultural programming demonstrate 
one way in which cultural isolation can be addressed. Aspects of culture 
and community can be preserved, as they have been in diaspora 
communities around the world, by investment in these types of spaces, to 
continue cultural practices as well as educational programs to pass down 
traditions to a younger generation. But this type of cultural investment takes 
both funding—possibly from federal sources participating in the overall 
coastal retreat of affected tribes—and planning by the tribes themselves. 
Finally, the experience of the King Island community in Nome 
underlines the need to establish set timelines for the relocation or 
collocation process. As described in the previous part, King Islanders 
lobbied for years for support to move to Cape Woolley, where they could 
reestablish their community, only to have the project die a gradual, quiet 
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death. This example should be a matter of concern for all Indian and Alaska 
Native communities seeking to relocate. Shishmaref first voted to relocate 
in 2002, but has not moved past the stage of federal government studies.
155
 
While the commissioning of studies is an important first step, every year 
without additional action pushes a community closer to emergency. If 
studies drag on long enough, they can come to delay the taking of action 
which might require millions of dollars and several years to implement until 
it is too late. 
Avoiding the worst consequences of climate-induced displacement will 
require action from both tribes and government. This will mean recognizing 
that, if current trends continue, many communities that would have elected 
to relocate will be displaced before a relocation can be funded and 
effectuated. Thus, affected tribes and government agencies supporting them 
should plan for how to preserve these communities in the event that they 
are forced to disperse.  
This is not an easy task. It means devoting focus to a Plan B without 
concluding that Plan A has failed. Moreover, as demonstrated by the urban 
relocatees of the 1950s, it will mean addressing a wide range of complex 
social, cultural and economic problems that can be difficult to anticipate ex 
ante. Addressing these issues will take planning and funding. And with 
global temperatures continuing to trend upwards, there is little time to lose. 
Conclusion 
Relocation is deeply intertwined with the history of Indian Country. The 
history of the United States is replete with episodes of settling, uprooting, 
and resettling Indian tribes—often to areas with no connection to their 
homelands. And while government strategies have changed from the forced 
migrations under the Indian Removal Acts to voluntary and semi-voluntary 
urbanization in the mid-twentieth century, these varied efforts have 
nevertheless repeatedly proven disastrous for affected tribes and 
individuals. 
As global climate change hurries the erosion of U.S. coastlines, we are 
on the verge of a new era of Indian relocation. But as of yet, few decisions 
have been made about what this era will look like. The failure of the federal 
government to delegate either the funds or the authority to coordinate the 
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resettlement of climate-displaced tribes means that the country has no 
coherent policy on how this relocation will occur. Today, many Indian 
communities are left planning to relocate using funds that may never 
materialize. As this planning process drags on, possibly for decades in some 
communities, it becomes increasingly likely that these communities will 
disperse to different locations in the aftermath of a disaster-induced 
displacement. 
The need for government clarity on a climate-induced relocation policy 
has long been established.
156
 But until funding and authority are delegated 
to support relocation efforts, affected Indian communities must attempt to 
address the uncertainties of what will happen if they are displaced by a 
severe storm or erosion event. Addressing these uncertainties means that 
both tribes and government agencies must take a hard look at the history of 
Indian relocation. This history demonstrates a series of destructive 
outcomes rooted in underinvestment in collocated communities and 
individuals as well as consistent discounting of the importance of culture 
and traditional practices to Indian community resilience.  
The consequences of this underinvestment can, in many cases, be 
countered. But this requires planning. It is imperative that communities 
electing to relocate focus not only on their Plan A—moving as a 
community—but also on a Plan B—how community and cultural bonds can 
be maintained if the community is displaced by a disaster. While it is 
tempting to conclude that tribal identity will be completely destroyed absent 
wholesale community relocation, this ignores the lessons of past 
relocations. Indian communities that are forced to disperse will undoubtedly 
sustain some irreplaceable cultural losses. However, a pragmatic approach 
to addressing Plan B alternatives will allow tribes and government agencies 
to work together to alleviate many of the inevitable burdens of 
displacement. 
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